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Simon Birnbaum, Tommy Ferrarini, Kenneth Nelson and  
Joakim Palme: The Generational Welfare Contract: Justice, 
 Institutions and Outcomes
Reviewed by Steffen Suur-Nuuja and Jörg Tremmel
P olitics: Who Gets What, When, How is the famous title of a classic (1936) book by Harold 
D. Lasswell, and a cogent formulation of 
the key question of political science as an 
academic discipline.
This question can be more specifically tar-
geted and reformulated as: “Who, in the 
capacity of being a young, middle-aged 
or old person, gets which entitlements 
when from the welfare state?” This is the 
question, albeit framed a little differently 
(see below), at the heart of the book The 
Generational Welfare Contract: Justice, In-
stitutions and Outcomes, written by Simon 
Birnbaum, Tommy Ferrarini, Kenneth 
Nelson and Joakim Palme. As one can see 
from the outset, the question is both nor-
mative (Who should get...?) and empirical 
(Who, de facto, gets...?). And the question 
is of a stubborn intractability as we all age 
and thus pass through different life spans. While Lasswell treated 
the “who” as one unified individual, the more refined question 
above treats it as the combination of intra-personal identities, that 
is: between our younger and older selves.
Birnbaum et al. focus on three particular stages of the life course: 
childhood, working age and old age (9). For each of these three 
stages, the authors claim a specific “vulnerability” (2) that justifies 
the ascription of “social citizenship rights” (8-10) to individuals. 
The book adds to the growing part of the literature that is in-
terested in intergenerational justice, but not in those abstract 
phenomena (such as the non-identity problem) that arise only 
if generations are treated as non-overlapping, non-coexisting en-
tities. Birnbaum et al. understand “generations” as “age groups” 
and “cohorts”. 
When the baby boomers born after the Second World War retire, 
they will not be replaced by cohorts of the same size. From this 
(uncontroversial) starting point, many other authors have ques-
tioned the long-term affordability of public programmes, such as 
health care and pensions, in their current extent. The proponents 
of an age crisis of the welfare state, namely its pension system, 
point to the massive impact (an “agequake”, according to Wallace 
2001) that the retirement of the baby boomers (if not postponed 
by a rising retirement age) will have for a welfare state’s abilities 
to pay all kind of social expenditures (Preston 1984; Kotlikoff/
Burns 2012). In terms of benefiting from the welfare state, some 
scholars call the post-baby boomers a “disadvantaged” (Green 
2017) or “precarious” (Bessant/Farthing/
Watts 2017) generation. The unwillingness 
of the “selfish” (Beckett 2010; Thomson 
1991) baby-boomer generation (who have 
all the political clout at the ballot box) to 
give up their social entitlements (which 
are, according to this view, privileges rather 
than rights) and the dire prospects of the 
post-baby-boomer generation are two sides 
of the same coin. In a similar vein, but add-
ing the assumption of an empowerment of 
the politically powerless post-baby boom-
ers, the thesis of “generational storms” or 
“clashes” (Kotlikoff and Burns 2012) has 
been brought forward. Some authors have 
even hypothesised that the existing implicit 
generational contracts (such as pay-as-you-
go pension systems) will be terminated 
soon by the youngsters if the ratio of pub-
lic resources that go to the elderly relative 
to the amount of resources going to young 
people is constantly increasing. 
In contrast, Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme proclaim the 
hypothesis that intergenerational welfare state contracts can lead 
to positive-sum solutions, and thus “it becomes an important task 
to identify and actively promote forms of intergenerational co-
operation that enhance the welfare of all age groups” (3). This 
approach emphasises the potential to make all successive genera-
tions in a political community better off by mutually cooperating 
instead of relying solely on their own savings: “Allowing welfare 
states to redistribute resources between members of different gen-
erations as they pass through different age groups (or life stages) 
should be conceived as an arrangement for borrowing from our 
later selves in early stages of our selves, and to save for old age 
during the more economically active years in life in a way that 
effectively serves the long-term interests of all citizens” (20). This 
refers to Norman Daniels’ prudential lifespan account as a concept 
for optimal allocation of resources during a lifetime. But is the 
step from intra-personal redistribution to intra-societal redistri-
bution justified? The main counterargument is that different age 
groups can have different sizes – a problem obviously not affecting 
a single person. In line with the fathers of pay-as-you-go pension 
systems (such as Winfried Schreiber in Germany), the authors 
hold that one can reasonably expect the support of one’s children 
if one has supported one’s parents. This principle has also been 
dubbed indirect reciprocity in the literature (e.g. Tremmel 2009). 
The main idea is cogently summarised by a popular legend: “[A]
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boy in ancient times accompanies his father and his grandfather as 
they embark on a ritual journey intended to end with the grandfa-
ther’s voluntary death, as he is no longer self-supportive. The boy 
takes pity on his grandfather and persuades his father to promise 
to support the old man until his natural death in exchange for a 
promise from the boy to do the same for his father when the time 
comes” (Lindh/Malmberg/Palme 2005: 470).
But what if the (grand)children generation is not as numerous as 
their parents’ generation? The authors concede that population 
ageing can lead to welfare state entrenchments. But they quali-
fy: “The one-eyed focus on pension reform may severely distort 
conclusions about generational justice as it fails to recognize that 
increases in pension expenditures do not always come at the ex-
pense of younger generations and their access to adequate social 
protection” (33). Moreover, the authors contradict the “demogra-
phy is destiny” thesis which postulates that ageing societies neces-
sarily have to cut back their expenditure. Instead, they write: “It 
is an undeniable fact that social spending on old-age benefits has 
increased alongside population ageing” (32).
The purpose of this book is to analyse how different welfare states 
respond to age-related social risks from a justice-based perspec-
tive, and if and under what conditions some countries perform 
better than others in promoting generational equity (2). To ap-
proach these matters, the authors want to bring together perspec-
tives from two strands of academic research: political philosophy 
and comparative social policy. This is to respond to perceived 
shortcomings: “Despite the long tradition in normative political 
theory of debating principles of social justice and their practical 
implications, conceptual and theoretical discussions often remain 
at high levels of abstraction with limited reference to systematic 
empirical evidence” (4). Comparative welfare state research, for 
its part, has too often been reduced to crude analyses of social 
expenditures without having developed a coherent framework 
“that specifies central principles in welfare state program designs 
of particular relevance for analyses on generational justice” (4).
This ambitious interdisciplinary approach is one of the strengths 
of the book. It is ambitious because it demands, to a certain de-
gree, the authors to be familiar both with techniques of descrip-
tive data analysis and regressions, and with the strands of the phil-
osophical debate about generational justice. Such a combination 
of the normative and the empirical approaches is seldom found, 
but it has great potential for new insights. Normative statements 
should be “fleshed out” empirically whenever possible. For in-
stance, the ongoing debate between protagonists of a “complete 
life course view” (Daniels 1988; Schokkaert/van Parijs 2003) and 
“relational equality” (McKerlie 2013; Bidadanure 2016) would 
strongly benefit from having their theories fleshed out with as 
much empirical evidence as possible. For readers who are not fa-
miliar with the debate: Daniels’ assumption is that it is not prima 
facie problematic that at one given point in time different age 
groups receive an unequal treatment from the state. Let’s assume 
that some countries spend much more on every elderly citizen 
than on every non-elderly one. Those who are old now were once 
young and those who are now young will some day be old. As 
long as the specific ratio value stays relatively stable over time, 
there is no inequality between people’s complete lives, as everyone 
belongs in turn to each of the age groups. Such cases of “Spar-
tan-childhoods for luxury-old-age” trade-offs (Vanhuysse/Trem-
mel 2018) are not per se signs of intergenerational injustice then. 
Against this complete life course view, other authors have posited 
a “relational equality view”, and argued that we should look at 
how people fare at each single stage of their lives independent of 
how they fare in terms of their lifetime as a whole. The fact that 
each generation X, while passing through their young age bracket, 
is dominated by the (then) old age group is not rendered fair by 
the fact that the same generation X will become the dominator 
(with regard to the succeeding generation Y) when they turn older 
and become members of the old age bracket themselves. 
Normative theories often abstain from real-life-contexts and are 
seldom operationalised. For instance, the relational equality the-
ory implicitly suggests statements about the monetary level of 
an adequate minimum income, independent of age. Not mak-
ing such statements explicitly is eschewing empirical tests of the 
hypothesised effects of such theories. Empirical research can and 
should inform normative debates. This is what the interdiscipli-
nary work The Generational Welfare Contract tries to do. Both 
philosophers and social scientists who work on intergenerational 
justice should make the effort to read those parts of the book that 
are respectively less accessible to them. 
Clearly structured, the introduction of the book is followed by 
three philosophical-theoretical chapters that discuss three perspec-
tives on generational justice, thereby establishing the theoretical 
and normative framework of the empirical research that follows 
in the later chapters. In Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, the notion of 
a “balanced generational welfare contract” is defined, thereby at 
the same time conceptualising three kinds of welfare contracts 
that are unbalanced because they are “pro-child”, “pro-work” or 
“pro-old”. The authors here enter into a vivid debate (without 
citing details) about indicators for the alleged pro-elderly bias 
where ageing welfare states are more supportive of retirees than 
of other age-groups. One prominent indicator was developed by 
Vanhuysse (2013) with the elderly-bias indicator of social spending 
(EBiSS) (for previous such approaches, see e.g. Lynch 2006; Tepe/
Vanhuysse 2010). In an update, Vanhuysse/Tremmel (2018) state 
that within OECD countries currently Poland, Greece, Italy, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic have the highest EBiSS levels: 
these states spend on average between 5.5 and 8.5 times as much 
on every elderly citizen as on every non-elderly one. With their 
own methodological approach, Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson and 
Palme come to strikingly different results (52): Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, the UK and the US are the pro-old 
regimes of our times (whereas four countries display pro-work 
schemes and no countries pro-childhood schemes, the rest are 
“balanced”). Unfortunately, the authors do not refer specifical-
ly to previous attempts to measure elderly-biased (or “pro-old”) 
welfare schemes. Regarding their own methodology, Birnbaum et 
al. explain: “[W]e use income replacement in major age- related 
social insurance schemes to measure and analyse the generation-
al structure of social citizenship. [...] For each age related social 
risk, entitlements are calculated net of taxes and expressed as 
percentages of an average production of worker’s net wage. [...] 
For old-age risks we use the yearly pension benefit of two mod-
el families; a single retired person and a married retired couple. 
In both instances, the breadwinner is assumed to have a 40-year 
employment record. The non-working spouse only qualifies for a 
minimum pension, if applicable. Income replacement for old-age 
risks is an additive index of the net pension replacement rate of 
Intergenerational Justice Review
1/2018
49
the two model families” (42-45). And regarding the dataset: “The 
database includes up to 47 countries and [...] we draw on data for 
18 long-standing welfare democracies from 1960 to 2010 which 
is the most recent wave of data” (42).
The distinction between “balanced” and “unbalanced” profiles 
is central for the rest of the book as “balanced profiles” is the 
independent variable in the regressions of Chapters 5-8 for wel-
fare state outcomes, such as poverty or wellbeing. Therefore the 
methodological construction of “balanced profiles” (and thus 
“unbalanced profiles”) deserves a closer look. Birnbaum et al. ex-
plain: “The cut-off used to determine whether social citizenship 
rights are balanced or not is of course to some extent arbitrary. 
We have for each country analysed differences in income replace-
ment between the three age-related risk categories by calculating a 
straightforward statistical measure of dispersion. We decided that 
it is reasonable to categorize profiles of income replacement in 
age-related social insurance with a relative standard deviation be-
low 20 percent as balanced” (50). If, on the other hand, one age 
group receives 20% more than the others, the scheme is defined 
as “unbalanced”, as illustrated in Figure 1.
It now becomes clear what the authors mean when they speak 
about “positive-sum solutions”: in countries where income re-
placement in social insurance is more evenly distributed across 
age-related social risks, the overall level of income replacement 
tends to be higher. A regression analysis (55) is conducted by the 
authors to lend evidence to the hypothesis that balanced schemes 
are causal for high overall levels of social expenditure, or, in the 
terminology of the authors, “high levels of social citizenship 
rights” (8).
The next three chapters all deal with specific welfare state out-
comes. As mentioned, balanced schemes (as constructed above) 
are used as the explanatory variable in a number of regressions 
that follow. In Chapter 5, the focus is on poverty, objectively 
measured. In Chapter 6, the focus shifts to wellbeing, subjectively 
assessed in the eye of the beholders. In Chapter 7, the analysis is 
complemented by a look on political and social trust; in Chapter 
8, (un)employment comes to the fore. 
With regard to poverty, their regression analysis shows that coun-
tries with a balanced generational welfare contract have significant 
lower poverty risks over all three age groups (77). The intermedi-
ary variable is the high overall level of income replacement. Con-
cerning subjective wellbeing (divided into life satisfaction and 
happiness), the analysis comes to the conclusion that balanced 
generational structures are related to high levels of subjective well-
being (91). The intermediary variable, again, is the high overall 
level of income replacement. 
With regard to citizens’ trust (in each other as well as in politi-
cal institutions), there is a positive correlation between balanced 
schemes and trust, and the regression analysis corroborates the 
hypothesis that the former causes the latter. There are a few out-
liers, though. The Netherlands and Switzerland are two countries 
with the pro-work type scheme, but they nonetheless have levels 
of social and political trust that are on a par with countries in the 
balanced group (100).
Being aware of conjectures in the literature that high levels of 
social expenditure might not foster high employment outcomes 
(“the dominating view in mainstream behavioral economics”, 
120), Birnbaum et al.’s study focuses on labour force participa-
tion as well. Their empirical results show that “(un)employment 
appears to be largely unrelated to the ways in which countries 
have organized their generational welfare contracts” (120).
In the concluding Chapter 10, the Swedish/Finnish author team 
reiterates the main findings and summarise: “The story that we 
are telling in this book thus clearly diverges from the narrative of 
an unavoidable generational war in social policymaking” (141).
The book has already received a lot of praise. Gøsta Esping- 
Andersen (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) has called it “arguably the 
single most important welfare state study in our times” (front cover). 
The Generational Welfare Contract is indeed an innovative, sen-
sible and topical work. There is no room here to discuss the pro-
claimed causalities between “balanced generational contracts” and 
a number of welfare state outcomes in detail. The most important 
contribution of this study, in our view, is one aspect that went 
largely unnoticed or is at least not particularly emphasised by the 
Swedish/Finnish author team: they have laid out a framework to 
further empirically test one vividly debated theory, the “selfish 
baby boomers” theory. This needs to be explained: as mentioned, 
two different concepts of “generation” are relevant with regard to 
public spending (for an illuminating visualisation, see Vanhuysse/
Tremmel 2018). First, when we want to evaluate intergeneration-
al justice over complete lives, we need the concept of (birth) cohorts. 
These are groups of people who were born in the same year or nar-
row range of years. Cohort members, by virtue of ageing together, 
experience distinct public policies but also external events (such 
Figure 1: The construction of the “balanced” scheme and an “unbal-
anced” scheme (here: pro-old) in comparison
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as deep recessions for the worse or technological progress for the 
better). Second, when we want to make a snapshot analysis of in-
tergenerational justice at a given moment in time, we need to look 
at age groups which are people of the same (narrow) age bracket at 
a particular moment. Age group members find themselves in the 
same stage in the lifecycle, which is politically relevant because 
public policies tend to institutionalise the life course, proscribing 
and inhibiting certain behaviours. As mentioned, many scholars 
(with Daniels) hold that it is not prima facie problematic that at 
one given point in time different age groups receive an unequal 
treatment from the state. But if such inequalities are perpetuat-
ed across different birth cohorts over the entire life cycle, then 
we do end up with intergenerational inequities. While fairness 
between age groups can involve unequal benefit treatment in dif-
ferent life stages, fairness between birth cohorts implies enjoying 
approximate equality in benefit ratios. To make such statements, 
empirical data must add up to a longitudinal series of the “snap-
shots”, mentioned above, for as many decades as possible. Using 
the EBiSS as an indicator, Vanhuysse/Tremmel 2018 derive from 
these considerations the conceptual statement that if those coun-
tries that have for instance a high EBiSS in 2010 had a low one 40 
years ago, age-group inequality would turn into cohort injustice, 
for this meant nothing else than people that were in their twenties 
and thirties in 1970 (that is: forty years ago) profited a lot from 
state benefits in all stages of their lives. 
One of the few empirical studies on how different generations 
have fared under the social welfare policies of governments since 
the 1930s is David Thomson’s (1991), who argues that in New 
Zealand “the big winners […] have been […] those born between 
about 1920 and 1945. Throughout their lives they will make con-
tributions which cover only a fraction of the benefits” (Thomson 
1991: 3). Recent studies (Chauvel/Schröder 2014; see also Chau-
vel 2010) have shown some empirical evidence that in countries in 
Southern Europe such as Spain, Italy, and France, the baby-boomer 
generation born after the Second World War has been significantly 
better off in terms of post-tax-and-transfer disposable income than 
cohorts born both beforehand and afterwards. In Birnbaum et al.’s 
methodology, the childhood bar would need to be highest in 1960, 
the working-age bar highest in 1980 and the old-age bar highest in 
2010 to justify the “selfish baby boomers” hypothesis.
Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme’s empirical analyses show 
diverging results for the 18 countries they have decided to look 
at (46-50). Some countries, such as Canada or Ireland, have an 
exchange between the pro-work bar and the pro-old bar between 
1980 and 2010 in favour of the ageing baby boomers, but a clear 
trend is not visible (and was not the focus of the Swedish/Finnish 
author team). 
A consolidated account of the 18 OECD countries depicts that in 
1960, childhood entitlements were quite low (around 20%) while 
working-age and old-age entitlements were about the same and 
about 40%. In 1980, the relative height of all bars is still the same 
but they all are higher. In 2010, all bars have approximately the 
same height, therefore forming what the authors call a “balanced” 
generational welfare contract (see Figure 3).
This might not be enough to repudiate the “selfish baby boomers” 
hypothesis (which in some of its variations is not focused on the 
past, but on the years when the baby boomers retire, that is from 
2025 on), but it lays out the path for further research.
All else being equal, interdisciplinary approaches are more ambi-
tious but also often more promising than mono-disciplinary ones. 
And in the case of The Generational Welfare Contract, the authors 
have lived up to the promise.
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